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5Editor’s Note:
In readying the content of Volume 1 Issue 2 of CEJISS, I was struck by the 
growing support this journal has received within many scholarly and profes-
sional quarters. Building on the success of the  rst issue, CEJISS has man-
aged to extend its readership to the universities and institutions of a number of 
countries both in the EU and internationally. It is truly a pleasure to watch this 
project take on a life of its own and provide its readers with cutting-edge analy-
sis of current political affairs. I would like to take this opportunity to thank our 
readers for their constructive criticism, comments and continued support.
Much has changed in the 6 months since CEJISS was  rst launched. I would 
like to introduce this issue with a brief commentary regarding the tense atmos-
phere currently clouding Israeli-Syrian relations. There is growing concern of 
clandestine, actual or potential WMD procurement in the greater Middle Eastern 
region, which has (rightly) attracted the attention of scholars and policy makers.
On 6 September 2007, it was reported that Israeli air force jets violated 
Syrian airspace, and after being engaged by Syrian anti-aircraft batteries were 
forced back to more friendly skies. Since the initial reports were made public, 
it has become clear that Israel’s actions were not accidental but rather part of a 
deliberate strategy to deal with potential Syrian nuclear weapons (or materials) 
acquisition, purportedly from North Korea. Two important issues have been 
raised:  rstly, the continued dangers of WMD proliferation in the Middle East 
and, possible ways of countering such proliferation.
While Israel’s nuclear programmes have been the subject of much debate 
– especially as Israel refuses to allow IAEA inspectors to assess its nuclear sites 
and capabilities – the fact remains that Israel is a (largely) responsible state in 
which there are many checks and balances to prevent the deployment of WMD 
in a wanton manner. Unfortunately, in most other Middle Eastern states such 
checks and balances are absent. This compounds the problem of WMD devel-
opment as regimes which control internal and external security policy without 
signi cant oversight are likely to utilise WMD (particularly nuclear weapons) 
as a strategically deployable weapon instead of adopting (as most other nuclear 
states have) a strategic view of WMD as residual; not a security mantle-piece.
If the accusations levelled against Syria – regarding its acquisition of nuclear 
weapons (or material) from North Korea – are accurate, then it con rms the 
worst fears of Israeli (and international) security analysts: that despite intense 
international pressures and investigations which attempt to dissuade WMD de-
velopment and smuggling, such weapons may be acquired with relative ease.
Israel’s military reaction to the Syria acquisition was a necessary and even 
encouraging response. It demonstrated a willingness to unilaterally respond to 
a nuclear provocation with maturity. It targeted non-civilian sites and focused 
its attention only on the source of danger. The deployment of special ground 
forces which directed Israeli warplanes to their target was dangerous though 
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Introduction
Si ce the early 1990s, one of the most striking characteristics to emerge in 
post-conflict peacebuilding has been the prime position assumed by democ-
ratisation; an approach we can term post-conflict democracy assistance . This 
focus h s hinged on an unerring belief that democratic gov rna ce, provided by 
periodic a d genuin  electi ns, offers the most effective mechanism for manag-
ing and resolving s cietal tensions without recourse to viole ce (Annan 2001; 
Boutr s-Ghali 1992, 1996) . I deed, the benefits of post-conflict democracy 
assistance have been promulgated for its capacity to advance peace, develop-
ment and human rights (Jarstad 2006; Lappin 2009; Rich and Newman 2004), 
and it has been embraced at the highest stratums of peacebuilding with, for 
example, Boutros-Ghali declaring that ‘peace, development and democracy 
are inextricably linked’ (1996: 116) .
Yet despite its growing recognition, the term has rar ly been clearly or 
co prehensively defined . Typically the term is used with the assumption tha
the reader will automatically understand the meaning; however, such casual
u ge can cause confusion and lead to s rious misco ceptions about what the
actual practice involves . This article seeks to bring great r clarity to our und r-
standing of post-conflict democracy assistance in the following four sections . 
The first section begins by tracing the emergence of democracy assistance as 
1 The title of this article is taken from the title of a short-story collection by Raymond Carver, 
What We Talk About When We Talk About Love .
2 Richard Lappin is a Ph .D . candidate at the Centre for Peace Research and Strategic Studies 
at the Unive sity f L uven in Belgium . Richard has participa ed i  over a dozen democracy
assistance missions with the UN, EU, OSCE and Carter Center and has recently completed 
assignments in Sierra Leone, Lebanon and Romania . Richard is currently a visiting scholar 
at the Faculty of Political Sciences at the University of Belgrade under the JoinEU-SEE 
programme and can be contacted at: richard .lappin@gmail .com .
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a distinct foreign policy instrument, the reasons why its popularity grew after 
the Cold War and how it has become an embedded feature of post-conflict 
peacebuilding . Second, the article highlights the unique characteristics of post-
conflict democracy assistance as a distinct foreign policy tool and distinguishes 
it from other approaches linked to democratisation . Third, the core problems 
that have developed as a direct result of definitional uncertainty over what 
democracy assistance entails are outlined . Finally, the article concludes by 
positing that the current ambiguity that surrounds the discourse on democracy 
assistance threatens not only the credibility of the approach, but that it also 
reflects a lack of thinking on the part of the international community as to what 
type of democratic end states are envisioned and what the appropriate means 
are to best achieve those ends .
The Emergence of Post-Conflict 
Democracy Assistance
Although democracy assistance did not assume a distinct profile in Western 
foreign policies until after the Cold War, its roots can be traced back further . 
Several sources have pointed to US sponsored electoral programmes in the Car-
ibbean following the Spanish-American War in the early 20th century, Woodrow 
Wilson’s promise to ‘make the world safe for democracy’ in the aftermath 
of the First World War, and political assistance, such as constitution writing 
and civic education, to Japan and Germany following the Second World War 
(Burnell 2000a; Carothers 1999: ch .2) . One interesting element of all of these 
early examples of democracy assistance is that they all occurred in post-conflict 
contexts .
The period of decolonisation during the 1950s and 1960s provided a fur-
ther precursor to contemporary democracy assistance, with many European 
countries exporting their own models of democracy to their former colonies . 
At the same time several countries began to introduce democracy and human 
rights clauses into their foreign aid packages, such as ‘Title IX’ of the 1966 
US Foreign Assistance Act, which linked foreign aid to participatory politics . 
The profile of democracy assistance was significantly enhanced by the election 
of Ronald Reagan to the US presidency . In 1983 Reagan established the first 
specific US democracy promotion institution, the National Endowment for 
Democracy (NED), and consistently spoke with passion about the values of 
democracy and his vision of a ‘global democratic revolution’ (Reagan 1988) . 
However, despite the rhetorical enthusiasm of Reagan, perceptions of external 
support for democracy during the Cold War were typically viewed with pes-
simism . Samuel Huntington (1984: 218) declared that ‘the ability of the US to 
affect the development of democracy elsewhere is limited,’ whilst Robert Dahl 
(1971: 209-210), argued that: 
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Policy makers in a country like the United States who may wish to transform 
a country from a hegemonic or mixed regime into a polyarchy [i .e . a liberal 
democracy] face formidable and complex problems, not least of which is 
our lack of knowledge about the long causal chains running from outside 
help to internal conditions to changes of regimes .
However, the end of the Cold War (1989-1991), and the seeming triumph 
of liberal democracy contributed to a widespread ideological consensus that 
liberal democracy, irrespective of internal preconditions, was the best political 
system available . As Fareed Zakaria (2004: 13) commented, democracy ‘has 
become the standard form of government for all mankind .’ This viewpoint 
found its most famous expression in Francis Fukuyama’s (1992) The End of 
History  thesis and, although contentious, its emphasis on democracy as the 
optimum form of governance was broadly accepted and seamlessly translated 
into peacebuilding strategies . As Eric Brahm (2004) has written, ‘once warring 
sides have reached a ceasefire, democracy is seen as uniquely suited to provide 
a peaceful means for power and influence .’ Expectations of the central role of 
democracy in peacebuilding were made evident in a string of policy statements 
made in both the US and Europe . For example, Bill Clinton (1995) declared that 
‘ultimately the best strategy to ensure our security and to build a durable peace 
is to support the advance of democracy everywhere .’ In 2001, the EU declared 
its ‘determination to promote stable, democratic environments, founded on 
the full enjoyment of human rights’ (Council of the European Union 2001) . 
Similarly, Kofi Annan (2000) has stated that ‘there are many good reasons for 
promoting democracy, not least – in the eyes of the United Nations – is that, 
when sustained over time, it is a highly effective means of preventing conflict, 
both within and between states .’ Moreover, these words were supported by 
formal institutions . The Electoral Assistance Unit was established by the UN 
in 1991, whilst in 1990 the OSCE created a similar organ, the Office for Free 
Elections, with an understanding that ‘pluralistic democracy [is a prerequi-
site]… for progress in setting up the lasting order of peace, security, justice and 
co-operation’ in Europe (CSCE 1990) .
In turn, theories expounding the role of external democracy promotion 
became increasingly fashionable . One such argument is that the widespread 
presence of democracies can serve as agents of diffusion which spread in-
ternational norms of democracy (Huntington 1991; Starr 1991) . The concept 
of diffusion has been summarised in policy statements, such as George W . 
Bush’s (2003) declaration that ‘a new regime in Iraq would serve as a dra-
matic and inspiring example of freedom for other nations in the region .’ 
Indeed, in an increasingly globalised world of advanced technology, travel 
and communications, it has become ‘increasingly difficult even for highly 
autocratic regimes to prevent demonstration effects reaching their own so-
ciety’ (Burnell 2000c: 7) . Additionally, there has been a notable increase of 
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literature concerning the value of military intervention to promote democracy, 
and although some authors are in support of this (Peceny 1999), the major-
ity remain sceptical about the long-term benefits (Bueno de Mesquita and 
Downs 2006) . Moreover, the Westphalian principle of non-interference has 
been subject to reinterpretation, with rights to democracy and peace now 
frequently trumping state sovereignty (Buxton 2006) . For example, the OSCE 
declare that ‘participating states emphasise that issues relating to human 
rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy, and the rule of law are of interna-
tional concern … and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the 
state concerned’ (CSCE 1991) . All of these factors have provided a platform 
for deliberate external efforts to foster democratisation to be pursued more 
vigorously .
Democracy assistance organisations themselves were also influenced by 
the wider external context . Democracy was arguably already on the march 
and Huntington’s (1991) ‘third wave’ thesis famously illustrated how a mul-
titude of states were already taking the democratic leap from as early as 
1974 . In fact, since the 1960s, it is estimated that there has been more than 
120 episodes of democratisation in nearly 90 countries (Kapstein and Con-
verse 2008: 57) . This trend is further supported by Freedom House who have 
measured global trends in freedom and democracy since 1972 and report that 
both have demonstrated a steady increase in the past 35 years . Accompanying 
this already existing trend towards democracy, was a growing recognition of 
individual human rights . Within this area, civil society organisations, such as 
Amnesty International, have grown exponentially in the past twenty years and 
have reached across national borders in their efforts to promote the respect of 
individual rights . The impact was evidenced in international law, with both 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights coming into force in 1976 . 
Similarly, the US, often viewed as a leader of the ‘free world,’ witnessed 
a Congress that passed 25 pieces of legislation linking foreign policy to hu-
man rights under the presidency of Jimmy Carter (Burnell 2000a: 37) . The 
growing recognition of international human rights is seen by many to provide 
a solid foundation for democracy assistance . As Hans Peter Schmitz (2004: 
408) states, ‘transnational activists diffuse democratic principles, support 
domestic allies, and exert pressure on authoritarian regimes .’ 
It can therefore be argued that a reverse causation was also occurring with 
democratic openings challenging established democracies to respond . As 
Carothers (1999: 44) explains: ‘the natural tendency to focus on the effects of 
democracy aid on democratisation in recipient countries overlooks the equally 
important causal relationship in the other direction – democratisation producing 
democracy aid .’ Indeed, in many respects the approach of democracy assistance 
can often be described as reactive rather than proactive . Thus, an understanding 
of the emergence of democracy assistance requires an appreciation of how 
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global events cause the democracy assistance community to respond to external 
stimuli (Burnell 2008: 428) .
Figure 1: The Global Spread of Democracy (Freedom House 2009)3
The Global Spread of Democracy
Year Total No. 
Countries
Free Partly Free Not Free
No. % No. % No. %
1972 151 44 29 38 25 69 46
1979 161 51 32 54 33 56 35
1989 167 61 37 44 26 62 37
1999 192 85 44 60 31 47 25
2009 193 89 46 62 32 42 22
Towards an Improved Understanding  
of Post-Conflict Democracy Assistance
By the end of the 1990s, the term ‘democracy assistance’ had acquired 
increased and extensive usage in academic literature and become a natural 
part of the rhetoric of the development programmes and foreign policies of 
Western countries . Yet, despite this growing recognition, the term has rarely 
been clearly or comprehensively defined . Typically, the term is used with 
the assumption that the reader will automatically understand the meaning; 
however, such casual usage can cause confusion, especially as other terms 
can be used to describe similar phenomena, such as the often used umbrella 
term of ‘democracy promotion,’ as well as a host of other variants includ-
ing ‘development aid,’ ‘political aid,’ ‘democracy support,’ ‘democracy aid,’ 
and ‘support for democratic development’ (Burnell 2000c: 3) . As such, it is 
critically important that researchers are cognizant of the breadth of meaning 
attached to democracy assistance by different people and practice precision in 
their own usage and definition of the term . Indeed, if we are unable to achieve 
accuracy in our terminology, the utility of the approach, both in theory and 
in practice, will ultimately be undermined .
Democracy assistance can be most accurately defined as the non-profit 
transfer of funds, expertise, and material to foster democratic groups, initiatives 
and institutions that are already working towards a more democratic society 
(De Zeeuw and Kumar 2006: 20) . These transfers are usually funded through 
governmental development agencies, such as the United States Agency for 
3 It is widely considered that ‘Free’ typically correlates to a stable, mature democracy, ‘Partly 
Free’ to a partial democracy, and ‘Not Free’ to an autocracy .
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International Development (USAID) the European Instrument for Democracy 
and Human Rights (EIDHR), or the UK’s Department for International Devel-
opment (DfID) . The programmes themselves are undertaken by a diverse group 
of inter-governmental organisations (IGOs), non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) and, to a lesser extent, through bilateral agreements . Chief amongst 
the IGOs are the Organisation for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE), 
the European Union (EU), and the Organisation of American States (OAS) . The 
most prominent NGOs include the Carter Center, the International Foundation 
for Electoral Systems (IFES) and the Centre for Electoral Promotion and Advice 
(CAPEL) . In addition, within a given country, there will also be a range of local 
counterparts who receive democracy funding including electoral commissions, 
state institutions, civil society groups, media groups and political parties .
In defining democracy assistance, it is paramount that the distinction be-
tween democracy assistance and democracy promotion is established . Although 
democracy promotion is often used interchangeably with democracy assistance, 
the latter should be recognised as only a small and distinct part of a much 
broader democracy promotion approach . As the table below illustrates, de-
mocracy promotion comprises several instruments, both positive and negative, 
both explicit and implicit, of which democracy assistance is only one distinct 
part . On the negative side, there is direct military action, which includes armed 
intervention to promote democracy and can be either explicit (to install a demo-
cratic regime, as in Afghanistan) or implicit (to curb an anti-democratic regime, 
as in the first Iraq war) . In addition, there is also the explicit tool of negative 
political conditionality, or ‘naming and shaming’, in which membership from 
international organisations may be suspended, economic sanctions applied, and 
embargoes enforced . 
On the positive side, there is the implicit instrument of classical develop-
ment aid which seeks to foster improved socioeconomic conditions which may 
consequently lead to democratic developments . Additionally, there is the positive 
instrument of international interim administrations, as was the case in East Timor, 
where the democratic transition is directly controlled and managed in its entirety 
by international actors . There is also the explicit instrument of positive political 
conditionality, which can include offers of membership in intergovernmental 
organisations, security guarantees, or economic and trade benefits . 
Finally, on the positive side, there is the distinct instrument of democracy 
assistance . Democracy assistance differs from all other forms of democracy 
promotion in several important ways . First, it is distinct from military action 
insofar that it does not ‘enforce’ democracy, and from international interim 
administration insofar that it does not ‘manage’ democracy . Second, democ-
racy assistance is directed primarily and exclusively at fostering democracy, 
as opposed to classical development aid in which democracy is usually only 
a secondary concern . Third, democracy assistance is distinct from positive 
political conditionality insofar that it encompasses direct and active measures, 
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rather than passive tools . Democracy assistance can be further differentiated 
from political conditionality insofar that it is neither a reward nor a punishment, 
neither a carrot nor a stick, but rather a ‘booster’ to internal groups already 
working towards democratisation . Democracy assistance is not concerned with 
‘exporting democracy’ (Schraeder 2002) or ‘spreading democracy’ (Hobsbawm 
2004) irrespective of the readiness of a given country; rather, democracy assist-
ance explicitly recognises that ‘the primary motive force for democratisation 
is and must be internal to the country in question’ (Burnell 2000c: 9), and that 
the exclusive intention is ‘to help domestic actors achieve what they have 
already decided they want for themselves’ (Carothers 2007b: 22) . Democracy 
assistance is therefore a very precise instrument within a broader democracy 
promotion paradigm .
Figure 2: Democracy Promotion Instruments (Table developed from: Huber 
2008: 46) 
Explicit Instruments Implicit Instruments
Positive Instruments • Democracy assistance 
• Positive political conditionality 
• International interim administrations
• Classical development aid
Negative 
Instruments
• Negative political conditionality 
• Military action
• Military action 
Problems Resulting From 
Definitional Uncertainty
Establishing the definitional clarity of democracy assistance is an important 
step towards understanding how three core problems have developed as a direct 
result of definitional uncertainties in democracy promotion terminology . The 
resultant problems concern, imprecise democracy assistance data, a neglect of 
the inherent limitations of democracy assistance, and the fostering of negative 
perceptions of democracy assistance .
Imprecise Democracy Assistance Data
The lack of definitional concreteness over what may be classified as democ-
racy assistance has meant that ‘the available data concerning how much and 
by whom remains relatively soft, variable in quality and far from complete’ 
(Burnell 2000b: 339) . Typically, different countries and organisations use dif-
ferent classifications and indicators to define and record democracy assistance . 
Moreover, these figures are often merged into standard development projects, 
thus presenting major complications for the disaggregation of precise and 
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direct democracy assistance from broad development statistics (Crawford and 
Kearton 2002; Green and Kohl 2007: 159; Knack 2004: 266) . In one of the 
few detailed cross-national studies of democracy assistance, Richard Youngs 
et al . (2006: 21) lamented that ‘no standard or easily comparable classification 
of political aid existed across states’ and, worryingly, that several countries had 
to compile the data upon request . Therefore, even seemingly comparable data, 
such as that from the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) of OECD-DAC, can be 
decidedly misleading due to the inability to accurately disaggregate the data .
Furthermore, as democracy has become increasingly associated with post-
conflict peacebuilding, almost any international assistance effort that addresses 
any development or peacebuilding issues can arguably be labelled as ‘democ-
racy assistance .’ In their study, Youngs et al. (2006: 21), note that ‘many states 
included in their democracy and governance categories aid projects that could 
not be reasonably said to have any meaningful bearing on political reform .’ 
Whilst Burnell (2000b: 339) has posited that some development agencies 
simply renamed their traditional development programmes as ‘democracy as-
sistance’ to demonstrate that they were in tune with fashionable governance 
themes . 
Such fastidiousness on the boundaries of what should be considered as 
democracy assistance is not to undermine the impact that broader development 
assistance can have on democratisation . As Steve Finkel et  al. (2007: 410) 
explain, indirect assistance ‘may promote modernisation, encourage better 
economic performance, and foster class transformations, all of which may have 
long-term implications for democratic development .’ However, the concern 
is that such a broad definition can lead to an expansive laundry list of things 
which ‘assist’ democracy, such as general poverty alleviation or the build-
ing of schools . Burnell (2000c: 12) claims that, although at times beneficial, 
this is problematic because ‘if democracy assistance is defined as whatever 
helps democratisation directly or indirectly, sooner or later, then our sense 
of it could be so generous as to undermine the value of the term .’ Carothers 
(2000: 188) offers a route out of this dilemma in his argument that democracy 
assistance should be considered all aid ‘for which the primary purpose, not the 
secondary purpose or indirect purpose, is to foster democracy in the recipient 
countries . It does not therefore include economic and social aid programmes .’ 
As it stands though, the lack of consistency in defining democracy assistance 
means that there is no precise baseline data in which meaningful evaluations 
of post-conflict democracy assistance can be drawn . 
Neglect of the Inherent Limitations 
of Democracy Assistance
A second problem that has been exacerbated by an inexact usage and under-
standing of the democracy assistance term has been a neglect of the inherent 
Democracy Assistance | 191
limitations of democracy assistance . Democracy assistance terminology has 
been increasingly employed by foreign policy communities and has created an 
appearance that it is a much stronger force than it truly is . The high expectations 
for democracy in helping to foster peace are evident in the very formulation 
of peace agreements . Many peace agreements, such as the 1992 Chapultepec 
Agreements of El Salvador and the 2002 Global and All-Inclusive Agreement 
of the Democratic Republic of Congo, stress the central role of democracy and 
affirm that elections will be held within a given timeframe as an illustration 
of a country’s transition towards peace . This focus on elections – often at the 
neglect of issues such as security sector reform, corruption, economic stimulus, 
or reconciliation – places an unenviable burden on the democratisation process . 
For their part, democracy assistance organisations, often at short notice and 
often with little time for preparation, have become the actor of first resort for 
all prospective transitions, irrespective of the countries suitability or likelihood 
of sustaining democracy .
The imbalanced focus on democracy in post-conflict peacebuilding is ampli-
fied by a tendency of democracy assistance organisations to focus on success 
stories and overestimate their capacity to initiate change . Until recently, the 
USAID website declared that (quoted in Knack 2004: 252): 
There were 58 democratic nations in 1980 . By 1995, this number had jumped 
to 115 nations . USAID provided democracy and governance assistance to 
36 of the 57 nations that successfully made the transition to a democratic 
government during this period .
Although the need to emphasise the positive aspects of their work in 
order to secure future funding may be understandable, such statements can 
severely skew the reality of democracy assistance . As Stephen Knack (2004: 
252) explains, ‘obviously the fact that many aid recipients have become more 
democratic does not by itself imply cause and effect .’ Indeed, democratisation 
studies have historically focused on internal considerations as the key factors 
in a country’s democratic transition, with attention given to areas such as: 
economic modernisation (Lipset 1959: 17; Przeworski et al . 2000); a history 
of pluralism (Reychler 1999); class structures (Moore 1966; Rueschemeyer et 
al . 1992); levels of education (Hadenius 1992; Rowen 1995); degree of ethnic 
fragmentation (Linz and Stepan 1996); religion (Hadenius 1992; Zakaria 2004: 
148-150); the legacy of colonialism (Bernhard et al . 2004; Bratton et al . 2004); 
the prevalence of Western values (Huntington 1997: 6) . Democracy assistance, 
therefore, is rarely the overriding reason, but it can help a country move more 
quickly in a direction that it is already going . As Carothers (2004: 60) reminds 
us, democracy assistance ‘is at most a facilitator of locally rooted forces for 
political change, not the creator of them .’ These sentiments are particularly 
salient to collapsed post-conflict states which offer few favourable internal 
pre-conditions for democratisation . 
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Additionally, within a post-conflict context, democracy assistance may have 
to play a subordinate role to the aims of the broader peace process (Lyons 2002: 
221) . As Krishna Kumar and Jeroen de Zeeuw (2006: 14) stress, ‘the promotion 
of democracy is not necessarily the only goal, and there are circumstances 
under which the international community has to make compromises in pursuit 
of competing objectives, such as avoiding a resumption of war .’ Indeed, it is 
worth stressing that although democracy assistance may have assumed a more 
central and influential role in the foreign policy of western states, it has not 
become the central organising principle (Carothers 1999: 37; Smith 2007: 132) . 
Sometimes, democracy assistance may be complementary to a wider foreign 
policy, but at times it will also come into competition with other, stronger 
economic and security interests . For example, in the US, democracy assistance 
funding remains a fraction of other areas of public spending such as defence,4 
whilst the country maintains strong relations with several undemocratic, but 
strategically important, regimes such as Saudi Arabia, China and Egypt .
Negative Perceptions of Democracy Assistance
The incoherency and inconsistency of democracy promotion policies in 
general – and what should qualify as democracy assistance in particular – has 
led to the intensification of the final problem; negative perceptions of democ-
racy assistance (Smith 2007: 129) . Although democracy assistance has become 
increasingly more visible in foreign policies, it has also been accompanied by 
a rising suspicion about the motives behind this embracement of democracy . 
Jennifer Moore (2007) has detailed how the democracy ‘brand’ has been dam-
aged by people manipulating the name for interests which have very little con-
nection to people power, whilst Carothers (1999: 3) claims that pro-democracy 
rhetoric ‘has sometimes been used deliberately to obscure a contrary reality .’ 
Although applicable to many states and intergovernmental organisations, this 
critique is most commonly directed at the US . Here, Barbara Rieffer and Kristan 
Mercer (2005) have documented how the Spanish-American War, the Vietnam 
War, and the invasion of Iraq, were all justified by the US as being in the 
name of democracy, precipitating scepticism about external efforts to support 
democracy both domestically and in target countries . Indeed, Bush’s persistent 
association of democracy assistance with the Iraq War and regime change did 
much to malign the concept and help to foster a perception in many parts of 
the world that democracy assistance was a mere euphemism for aggressive 
US interventionism . As Hobsbawm (2004) acerbically comments, ‘one should 
always be suspicious when military powers claim to be doing favours for their 
victims and the world by defeating and occupying weaker states .’ 
4 The US defence budget is typically estimated at above $400bn, in comparison to the most 
optimistic estimations of US democracy assistance, which estimate an absolute maximum of 
$1bn . 
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Additionally, the consistent prioritisation of economic interests over democ-
racy has also tarnished the image of external assistance . Examples include US 
commercial cooperation the Argentine junta during the 1970s and 1980s and the 
EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) . As Rieffer and Mercer (2005: 390) 
comment, Western countries ‘benefit from protectionist policies and subsidies 
even though these policies may hurt the long-term economic viability – and 
thus democratic prospects – of these partially democratic developing countries .’ 
The continuing positive relations between Western countries and undemocratic 
regimes have further amplified concerns that the new focus on democracy as-
sistance is essentially a euphemism for traditional realist foreign policies . This 
is somewhat unfortunate, as just because democracy is a low priority in one 
country, does not mean that democracy assistance projects in all other coun-
tries are not serious or have ulterior motives . Nevertheless, this has resulted in 
a situation where the overall concept of democracy assistance is often cast in 
a negative light before the actual substance of a programme is even examined . 
As Carothers (2007a: 11) notes in respect of the US: 
The sad, mildly ironic reality of the Bush approach to democracy promo-
tion is that it may represent the worst of both worlds: It has soured people 
all around the globe, and many in the United States as well, on the very 
legitimacy and value of US democracy promotion, despite having involved 
only a limited engagement in democracy promotion .
What Model of Democracy (Assistance)?
The definitional ambiguity that surrounds democracy assistance conceals 
a more profound disagreement over the very nature of democracy itself . If 
the international community is to address the problems already cited with 
the democracy assistance terminology, then it is fundamental that they also 
confront – or at least acknowledge – the problem of defining democracy . For 
when all is said and done, we still need to be able to answer the question: ‘what 
democracy are we assisting?’
Does the international community favour a minimalist model of democracy 
based on Joseph Schumpeter’s concept of an ‘institutional arrangement for 
arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide 
by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote’ (1947: 269)? Cer-
tainly several other influential authorities favour a minimalist, electoral-based 
approach (Dahl 1971; Huntington 1991: 7; Przeworski et al . 2000) . Or does 
the international community prefer a more expansive, maximalist definition 
of democracy which emphasises the normative underpinnings and the sub-
stantive virtues of democracy which stresses the importance of participation, 
citizenship, and political activity (Barber 1984: xiv; Held 1996; Young 2000: 
3) . We might also ask to what extent is there space for local appropriations 
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of democracy? And to what extent do these local interpretations skew our 
(Western) understanding of democracy and the benefits it is intended to bring 
to peacebuilding? (Karlstrom 1996; Paley 2002)
Naturally, the merits and limitations of the various models of democracy 
– and how each may contribute to peacebuilding – demands a far greater 
exploration that goes beyond the remit of this article . However, the values 
and assumptions that are attached to democracy by international organisations 
have been left largely unexplored (Jarstad 2006; Lappin 2009) . Democracy 
remains a fundamentally contested term, and one which can have a far reaching 
impact on post-conflict democracy assistance . As Wim Van Binsbergen (1995: 
6) states, if democracy means different things to different people, ‘the process 
of bringing about or enhancing democracy, may refer to distinct and quite 
different phenomena .’ Luc Reychler (2001: 216) concurs, arguing that ‘the 
dispute over the operational definition influences the transformation process 
to a large extent .’ Moreover, the definition of democracy that organisations are 
working towards can play a significant role in evaluating strategies, establishing 
funding priorities, and deciding when a country has reached an adequate level 
of democracy .
Conclusion
This article has examined the emergence of democracy assistance as a dis-
tinct foreign policy tool in post-conflict peacebuilding . Moreover, it has shown 
how definitional confusion between democracy assistance and other democra-
cy-oriented concepts, presents grave problems that threaten to undermine the 
practice of post-conflict democracy assistance . A lack of clarity, consistency, 
and consensus, as to what democracy assistance entails has diminished our 
ability to evaluate democracy assistance effectively (due to imprecise data), 
has created unrealistic expectations of what democracy can achieve in post-
conflict environments (due to a neglect of internal factors of democratisation 
and broader foreign policy objectives), and has resulted in a general negative 
perception of democracy assistance (due to the misappropriation of the term 
to include elements such as military force or economic sanctions) . The politi-
cal consequences of the lack of definitional clarity are therefore considerable . 
Indeed, not only does it possess the potential to severely undermine the suc-
cesses and credibility of post-conflict democracy-assistance, but it also reflects 
a fundamental deficit in our thinking about what type of democracy we are 
assisting and how we should assist it . If the international community can not 
articulate the democratic end goals it envisions, the likelihood of formulating 
effective democratic means will remain improbable .
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